France lost the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 and had to pay a heavy penalty as a result. The Treaty of Frankfurt, signed on 10 May 1871, stripped her of Alsace and parts of Lorraine as well as requiring her to pay a war indemnity of 5 billion francs in gold ($23.7 billion in 2022 dollars). It is usually taught that the Germans punished the French too harshly, thus virtually guaranteeing a future war in which the French would try to extract a terrible revenge. That desire for payback manifested itself in the Versailles Treaty, which in turn led to the rise of Hitler and the Nazi Party along with their own war of vengeance. But how justified is this criticism? Were the German demands really that unreasonable?

The Prussians debated this point themselves in 1871. In the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, the victorious Prussians also argued about how seriously to penalize the losing Austrians. The King wanted to annex Bohemia and Troppau as well as demand a sizable indemnity. However, Bismarck successfully maneuvered the situation to his desired result: no annexations and an indemnity that was one-sixtieth of what the French would be inflicted with 5 years later.^[1] He needed Austro-Hungary to at least remain neutral in the upcoming war with France he had in mind and the only way to accomplish that was to make sure she was treated mercifully after losing the war. As we can see from what happened in history, that part of his plan worked out perfectly.

However, other powerful figures in Prussia decided that history would not be repeating itself in 1871. They demanded and obtained an indemnity of 5 billion francs ($23.7 in 2022 dollars), Lorraine up to Metz and Thionville, all of Alsace, and a victory parade through the streets of Paris^[2] to rub the French’s faces in their defeat. In addition, France also had to pay the occupation costs of the German occupation until the indemnity was paid off.^[3] The only real concession France received was a reduction of the war indemnity from an initial demand of 6 billion francs to 5 billion as well as not losing Belfort or Nancy. The French had tried to negotiate a 1.5-billion-franc payment claiming they wouldn’t be able to pay more, but the Prussians threatened to occupy France until they found the 5 billion francs in question.^[4] That settled the issue. At this point, it is important to note that Bismarck did not make any demands regarding France’s colonial holdings nor were there any long-term limitations placed on the size and composition of her Army and Navy.^[5]

We must now look at the question of whether or not this financial burden was too much for France to bear. The quick answer is a resounding NO. ‘France roared back, impelled in large part by its own modernization. The Third Republic, proclaimed three days after Sedan, spread banks, schools, roads, and railways into the provinces, reduced illiteracy, improved public health, spurred industry, inculcated a sense of being “French” (as opposed to Gascon or Breton), and reformed an army that, for all its pre-war grittiness and legends, had been an unhealthy, dim-witted institution.’^[6] As we have just read, we can see that the Prussian terms were not nearly as harsh or damaging as has been depicted in most books because France recovered from the war and its aftermath quite quickly. However, there is another aspect of this story that needs to be examined.

For that, we must go back to 9 July 1807 to the Treaties of Tilsit during the Napoleonic Wars. After defeating the Prussians at Jena and Auerstädt, as well as vanquishing the Russians at Friedland, France under Napoleon and Russia under Alexander I teamed up to reduce Prussia to a second-rate power for the foreseeable future at the time. The treaties stipulated that ‘it must cede to France all Prussian lands west of the Elbe, and must return to Poland all of Prussia’s pilferings in the three partitions. It must accept and pay for the occupation of Prussia by French soldiers until it should have completed payment of 160 million francs as a war indemnity. By this treaty, signed on July 9, 1807, Prussia lost forty-nine percent of her former terrain, and 5,250,000 of her former 9,750,000 population. In the years 1806–08 the cost of the occupation forces and the payments on the indemnity took up the entire revenue of Prussia.’^[7] Furthermore, Prussia was limited to an army of only 43,000 troops, making her relatively defenseless in a major conflict.^[8] The terms were so severe that Talleyrand himself (the Minister of Foreign Affairs) spoke out against them, urging restraint, to no avail.

Contrast this to how Prussia treated France at the end of the Franco-Prussian War and you will see that event in a totally different light. The French territorial loses were slight, well under 10% as opposed to the 49% that Prussia had lost under Tilsit, and their population loss was far less as well at only 1.6 million out of 38 million (a mere 4.2% compared to the 53.8% that Prussia had lost). France also did not have any limitations placed on the size of its military as they had inflicted on Prussia in 1807. Furthermore, the Prussian occupation costs did not amount to the ruinous amount Prussia had no choice but to pay. There is a reason why Prussia required decades to recover while France needed only a few years to revive itself.

All in all, the French actually got off quite lightly compared to how she behaved when she had defeated Prussia before. If the Prussians behaved like she had done, the terms of the Treaty of Frankfurt would have been so much more severe, leaving the French with something to really complain about. In fact, crippling France likewise would have likely changed subsequent European history to Prussia’s benefit.

From all of this, we can conclude that the French war indemnity and their territorial losses were not only justified in light of the lost war, but they were mercifully mild considering what Prussia could have rightfully demanded to avenge the ruinous humiliation they had suffered at the hand of the French ancestors of the current negotiators in 1871.

Sources

Badsey, Stephen. Essential Histories: The Franco-Prussian War. Osprey Publishing.
Durant, Will and Ariel. The Story of Civilization Volume XI: The Age of Napoleon: A History of European Civilization from 1789 to 1815. New York, USA: Simon and Schuster, 1975.
(Franco-German War | History, Causes, & Results | Britannica)
(Page:EB1911 – Volume 02.djvu/662 – Wikisource, the free online library – referencing an Encyclopedia Britannica article)
Wawro, Geoffrey. The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871. New York, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

1. Wawro p.304.[↩]
2. Ibid.[↩]
3. Franco-German War | History, Causes, & Results | Britannica[↩]
4. Wawro p.305.[↩]
5. Badsey p.83.[↩]
6. Wawro p.310.[↩]
7. Durant p.179.[↩]
8. Page:EB1911 – Volume 02.djvu/662 – Wikisource, the free online library– referencing an Encyclopedia Britannica article[↩]